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Maty Konte ∗
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Abstract
This paper re-examines the impact of remittance inflows on growth using data for devel-
oping countries over the period 1970-2010. The paper seeks to understand why it has been
so difficult to find a positive impact of remittances on growth despite the growing amount
of remittances in many developing countries and the different studies that have emphasized
the positive effect of remittances on poverty and inequality. We relax the hypothesis that all
countries follow the same unique growth regime and test whether the impact of remittances
on growth depends on the growth regime to which a country belongs. We apply the newly
bias-adjusted three-step finite mixture approach, which incorporates corrections into the dif-
ferent steps of the estimation. We find that our data are best described by an econometric
model with two different growth regimes: one in which remittances have a positive and sig-
nificant impact on growth and another in which the effect of remittances is insignificant. The
analysis of the determinants of the probability of being in the remittances growth-enhancing
regime shows that an increase in the level of financial development decreases the probabil-
ity of a country being in this growth regime, while being a Sub-Saharan African country
increases this probability.
Key words: Remittances, Growth Regimes, Three-step Mixture of regression,
JEL Classification: F24; O47
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1 Introduction
Remittance inflows have significantly increased in many developing countries during the last
years, surpassing the international official aid inflows, and they are currently ranked as the
second-largest external capital flows after foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI). Data from
the World Bank report an amount of approximately US $ 325 billion of remittances for the
year 2010. In many developing countries, workers remittances relative to the gross domestic
product are estimated to have been more than 10% for instance in Honduras or Senegal and to
have exceeded 20% in Lesotho, Moldova or Nepal in 2010. Influential literature has shown that
remittances lead to desirable development features by alleviating poverty and inequality and
smoothing the consumption of the receivers. Yet, there is no consensus on whether remittances
are beneficial or detrimental to economic growth, and the debate on the impact of remittance
inflows on growth remains inconclusive.
On the one hand, the optimistic view supports the evidence that remittances have a positive
direct impact on countries’ growth rate; see Catrinescu et al. (2009), World Bank (2006a)
among others. There are different explanations for the mechanisms through which remittances
enhance economic growth. For instance, remittance inflows may stimulate investment in human
capital by rising the school expenditures and the incentive of the recipient households (Edwards
and Ureta (2003)). It may also increase the stock of physical capital (Lucas (2005), Glytos
(2002)), which in turn is beneficial for the investment of small businesses and good, talented
entrepreneurs who do not have access to finance (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006a)).
On the other hand, the more skeptical view argues that remittances are a curse for the
growth rate (e.g, Chami et al. (2003) and Singh et al. (2011) ), or at best do not affect it (see
Rao and Hassan (2011), Barajas et al. (2009)) 1. Different channels of transmission have been
proposed to explain the curse of remittances. It has been suggested that remittances are not
particularly spent towards growth-enhancing activities. Instead, these inflows have an altruistic
effect since they are oriented into consumption ((Stark 1995)) rather than productive activities.
It has also been argued that remittances may increase the receivers’ incentive to switch from
labour activities to leisure, known as the moral hazard effect (e.g,Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo
(2006b), Lokshin and Glinskaya (2009), Cox-Edwards and Rodr´ıguez-Oreggia (2009), and Ebeke
(2012)). Remittance inflows are also associated with the appreciation of the real exchange rate,
slowing down the exportation activities, a phenomenon known as the Dutch Disease Hypothesis
1See also Senbeta (2012), Ahamada and Coulibaly (2013) for recent findings on the neutral impact of remit-
tances on growth.
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(Acosta et al. (2009), Bourdet and Falck (2006)). Other scholars have attempted to investigate
whether the impact of remittances on the growth rate depends on certain country characteristics,
such as the level of financial development or the institutional climate (Catrinescu et al. (2009)).
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Surprisingly, in these different studies the possibility that countries may follow different
growth regimes or processes has received very little attention, despite the recent influential
literature that has rejected the hypothesis of a single, unique growth regime that is identical for
all countries in growth regressions (e.g, Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Owen et al. (2009), Bos
et al. (2010)). This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effect of remittances
on economic growth in developing countries, endogenously taking into account the possible
unobserved heterogeneity in the data that may yield an inconclusive conclusion on the impact of
remittances on the growth rate in the literature. We relax the hypothesis that all countries follow
a single, unique growth regime in favour of multiple growth regimes such that remittances may
affect growth differently across the different growth regimes. We then test whether the impact
of remittances on the growth rate depends on the growth regime to which an economy belongs.
We further investigate the determinants of the probability of a country being the remittances
growth-promoting regime and control for financial development and geographical location.
Although some scholars have tried to divide the sample according to a-priori imposed vari-
ables, such as financial development or institutions (e.g Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) and
Bettin and Zazzaro (2011)), and to allow for heterogeneity in the effect of remittances on growth,
the possible heterogeneity that may exist in common coefficients on the other regressors included
in the models are ignored and not tested. In addition, some recent studies have restricted their
sample to countries that share similar observed characteristics and considered for instance data
only for developing countries, Sub-Saharan African nations or Small Island Developing States
(e.g, Singh et al. (2011) or Feeny et al. (2014)). 3, However, there is no consensus on whether
countries that share comparable observed characteristics, such as the level of income or geograph-
ical location, behave similarly in their growth process. In contrast, some influential studies have
provided evidence that countries with different characteristics may follow similar growth tra-
jectories, and that countries with similar observed characteristics may follow different growth
trajectories; e.g Paap et al. (2005), Alfo et al. (2008) and Owen et al. (2009).
In our framework, countries are not a-priori assigned to growth clusters or regimes based on
2The mechanism channel through investment in physical capital has also been analyzed (Ahamada and
Coulibaly (2013))
3See also Senbeta (2012)
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observed characteristics such as income, financial development or geographical location. Instead,
the identification of the existence of the different growth regimes is based on the similarity of
countries in terms of their growth trajectory over time given all the available information in the
data. In other words, countries that present similar conditional distributions of their growth
rates are sorted into the same growth regime. For this purpose, we propose to use a bias-
adjusted three-step finite mixture-of-regressions method, a semi-parametric approach suited to
model heterogeneity. In the first step, we define the latent class model; next, in the second step,
we predict the posterior probabilities of growth regime membership for all countries; and in the
third step, we use these estimated probabilities to assess the relationship between growth regime
membership and external variables, also known as concomitant variables. One concern that we
may face with the three-step approach is that the results in the third step may be downward
biased because of the classification errors that may occur in the second-step when assigning
countries into latent growth regimes (See Bolck et al. (2004)). Recently, Vermunt (2010) and
Bakk et al. (2013) have proposed an adjusted three-step approach that provides a correction of
the classification errors in the third step, which then helps our three-step mixture-of-regressions
model to perform better. 4
This approach has several desirable features compared with the previous literature on the
effect of remittances on growth. First, in contrast to studies that have examined whether the
impact of remittances on growth varies according to a country’s financial development and/(or)
quality of institutions, we leave the data to detect whether yes or no countries in our sample
follow the same, unique growth regime without any ex-ante assumptions on the assignment of
countries to growth regimes. In fact, the heterogeneity is modelled based on a latent effect on
each country’s growth trajectory, which provides greater flexibility and a better estimation of the
effect of remittances on the growth rate. For each country, we are able to estimate its probability
of belonging to the growth regime in which remittances have a significant positive impact on
growth. Compared with the previous studies that have included a term of interaction between
financial development and remittances in the growth regression, we adopt a different strategy
and consider whether the level of financial development has any effect on the probability of a
country being assigned to the remittances growth-enhancing regime.
Second, as far as we know, this paper is the first to proceed in three-steps in the estimation
of the mixture-of-regressions model in the empirical growth literature. Most of the previous
studies have proceeded in one step in which the determination of the latent growth regimes and
4This adjusted step-three analysis procedures proposed by Vermunt (2010) and Bakk et al. (2013) is imple-
mented in the latest version of the LatentGold, 5.0
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the prediction of the countries’ growth regime membership are computed simultaneously in one
step. However, this one-step procedure may present the disadvantage that the latent growth
regime profiles may change when a variable used to predict regime membership is added or
removed, besides the fact that the number of parameters to estimate increases with the number
of concomitant variables. To overcome these different issues, we propose to take one further
step and apply the new adjusted three-step mixture-regression that introduces a correction of
the bias that may occur from the classification errors in the second step.
In this study, we use a sample of more than 90 developing countries covering the period
1970-2010. We find that the data are best described by an econometric model of 2 different
growth regimes. In the first regime, the impact of remittances on growth remains insignificant,
while in the second regime, remittances have a positive and significant effect on the growth rate.
Roughly 47% of the countries are in the first group and the remaining 53% are in the second one.
There is substantial heterogeneity of countries within growth regimes, in terms of their level of
development and remittances as well as in terms of their geographical location, indicating that
our classification does not coincide with the ones obtained by ad hoc ex ante classifications. SSA
countries represent 21% of the countries in the first group, while they are more likely to be in
the remittances growth-enhancing group, in which they account for slightly less than half of the
components. The analysis of the determinants of the probability of being in the remittances
growth-enhancing regime shows with some reservation that an increase in the level of financial
development decreases the probability of a country being in the remittances growth-enhancing
regime, while being a Sub-Saharan African country increases this probability.
This paper is closely related to three strands of the literature. First, it is in line with the
empirical literature on the impact of remittances on the growth rate in developing countries.
The results are mixed and the debate remains open-ended. While some scholars have argued
that remittances have a negative impact on growth, others have supported the optimistic view,
arguing that remittances have a significant impact on the growth rate. Singh et al. (2011),
in a sample of SSA countries, found that remittances have on average a negative impact on
the growth rate of African countries. Catrinescu et al. (2009) reconsidered the relationship
between remittances and long-run economic growth, and extended the framework of Chami
et al. (2003) by addressing the heterogeneity issue, which may be a source of inconsistent
conclusions. Employing dynamic panel regression techniques, they found that remittances have
a positive and robust effect on the long-run growth rate. Another part of this literature has
instead supported a neutral view in this debate, and has been argued that the different results
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from the previous studies may be subject to some econometric issues, and that overall the
effect of remittances on growth is not statistically significant. For instance, Ruiz et al. (2009)
pointed-out the non-linearity in the relationship between remittances and economic growth,
something that may be a source of bias. The authors applied a non-parametric strategy that
does not impose any a-priori functional form on the relationship between economic growth and
remittances. Their results showed a significant positive effect of remittances on growth, but
it became insignificant once the non-linearity correction was considered. Senbeta (2012), in
a sample of developing countries, analysed the effect of remittances on key important factors
for growth: the capital accumulation and the total factor productivity (TFP). They found a
positive impact of remittances on the former but a non-significant effect on the latter, a result
that enabled them to argue that remittances do not generate growth because of the neutral
effect of remittances on TFP, an important factor in the growth process.
Second, this paper also contributes to the literature that tries to determine the possible
indirect mechanisms through which remittances may affect growth. One of the most explored
channels is the one linking remittances and the level of financial development. For instance,
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) tested whether remittances and financial development are
substitutes or complements in panel data of developing countries. They found that remittances
do not have a direct significant impact on growth, but their effect depends on the level of
financial development. Similar findings were also provided by Nyamongo et al. (2012), but
these results are not robust and depend on the indicator of financial development used. In
contrast, Bettin and Zazzaro (2011) did not support the substitution theory; instead, their
results are in line with the complementary view. These authors used different indicators of
financial development that capture the efficiency of the financial system in a country, compared
with the previous studies that rather focused on indicators of depth. Additional mechanisms
through which remittances may affect growth have been tested, among them, the investment
in physical capital (see Ahamada and Coulibaly (2013)), capital accumulation and total factor
productivity (see Senbeta (2012)).
The current paper also follows the recent literature on the existence of multiple growth
regimes in growth analysis, placing particular attention on the unobserved heterogeneity that
may provide biased estimates in growth regressions. Starting with Durlauf and Johnson (1995),
the hypothesis that all countries follow the same unique growth regime has been rejected in favour
of multiple regimes in a number of papers with different econometric tools. 5 Recently, scholars
5The econometric approach mainly used in this paper is the classification analysis and regression tree proposed
by Breiman et al. (1984). This methodology has also been applied by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) who
6
have proposed the use of the mixture-of-regressions method, which is an endogenous semi-
parametric clustering method. This approach presents desirable features in terms of flexibility
and goodness of fit, which explain its use in recent studies. Starting with Paap et al. (2005) and
Owen et al. (2009) who investigated the question of whether countries follow the same growth
process/regime, a more recent line of the literature has used this methodology to re-analyse
some open-ended debates. For instance, Flachaire et al. (2014) used this approach to examine
why it has been so difficult to find a positive and significant impact of political institutions on
the growth rate, despite the existing theory that has proven their importance in the growth
process. Konte (2013) also used this approach and showed that the impact of natural resources
on growth depends on countries’ growth regime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used for the
estimations, while Section 3 presents the econometric method. Section 4 discusses the main
findings and provide some robustness checking, and the last section concludes.
2 Data
We use 5-year panel data of more than 90 developing countries for the period 1970-2010, which
yields 8 different time periods. The dependent variable is the average annual growth of the real
GDP per capita (growthi,t). Data on the GDP per capita are taken from the Pen World Table
PW 7.1. Our main variable of interest is remittance inflows, measured as the ratio of the total
personal inflows to the total gross domestic product. Both, the remittance inflows data and
the GDP are taken from the World Development Indicators database. The remittances inflows’
calculation is based on a number of different sources, and it includes data from the IMF Balance
of Payments Statistics database, as all as data from central banks, national statistical agencies,
and the World Bank country desks.
As additional explanatory variables, we include the initial level of the GDP per capita from
the PW 7.1, which allows us to assess the convergence versus divergence hypothesis in our data.
We also control for the investment in physical capital taken from the PW table, averaged over
the 5-year period. Furthermore, we include the following explanatory variables: the average
population growth rate from the PW 7.1 augmented by a depreciation and technological change
term commonly fixed at 0.05; a proxy for the degree of openness defined as the share of the
total amount of the imports and the exports in the total GDP from the PW 7.1; and an index
segregated countries with respect to the level of financial development. This approach segregates countries with
respect to the optimal level of threshold of at least of a-priori defined variable. This method presents the limitation
that we need first to choose a-priori variables that we would like to use to discriminate the data, ignoring the
possible heterogeneity that may exists on the other variables included in the models.
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of inflation from the World Development Indicators. These different variables are all averaged
over the 5-year period. The data description and sources are shown in table 1.
Another important issue that we would like to investigate in this paper is the extent to
which the degree of financial development may explain the classification of the countries into
the different growth regimes. We are specifically interested in determining whether the level of
financial development may have a significant effect on the probability of countries following the
growth regime in which remittances may affect growth positively. We mainly consider quanti-
tative indicators of financial development that measure financial depth. We use the indicator of
liquid liabilities relative to the GDP from the Financial Development and Structure Dataset, as
well as an index of broad money and an index of domestic credit, both relative to the GDP and
taken from the World Development Indicators.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis,
and the coefficients of correlation between these variables are reported in table 2.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Baseline model
Our baseline parametric model of estimation is expressed as follow:
growthi,t = β0 + β1gdp0,i,t + β2(popi,t + 0.05) + β3invi,t
+β5remiti,t + β6opennessi,t + β7inflati,t + β8findevi,t + εi,t
(1)
We assume that the error terms εit are identically and independently distributed and follow a
normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2.
The key parameter of interest is β5, which tells us the average marginal impact of increasing
the level of remittances on the growth rate. However, this equation assumes that all countries
follow the same unique growth regime or process, and that the effect of the explanatory variables,
such as remittances on growth, is similar for all countries. This hypothesis of homogeneity
may be questionable given the recent literature that has investigated in depth the question of
whether all countries follow the same growth process. It has been well established that the
models with multiple growth regimes dominate the single growth regime models. However, little
effort has been made to test endogenously, without any ex ante assumption, whether the effect of
remittances on growth is heterogeneous and depends on the growth regimes to which countries
are assigned. One study that may be an exception is by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009)
who attempted to sort countries into groups according to their level of financial development
using classification and regression tree analysis. They found that the regime with a high level
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of financial development shows a lower marginal impact of remittances on the growth rate.
However, this approach presents a number of limitations in profiling the countries of the growth
regimes. First, the determination of the growth regimes is based on a single variable, financial
development, without testing the influence that the other variables included in the model may
have on grouping countries into regimes. Second, the classification analysis and regression tree
method has been criticized because of its lack of appropriate asymptotic assumption needed for
inference on threshold variables choices and their values (Tan (2010)). The recent literature
on multiple growth regime analysis has extensively used the mixture-of-regressions approach,
which is a semi-parametric method suitable for the analysis of the existence of multiple growth
regimes. Our paper follows this line of the literature and proposes to apply the new bias-adjusted
three-step mixture-of-regression method.
3.2 Bias-adjusted three-step finite mixture-of-regressions
This section presents the mixture-of-regressions approach using the three-step strategy instead of
the-one step strategy. Most of the studies on growth empirics that have used this approach have
applied the one-step method, in which the determination of the latent growth regimes and the
prediction of countries’ growth regime membership are computed simultaneously. However, this
one-step approach presents some limitations. 6 First, the growth regime profile determination
may be affected when we add or remove a variable used for the growth regime membership
analysis. Second, when we proceed in one step, we include simultaneously in the same model
variables that participate in the determination of the growth regimes, and variables used to
explain the countries’ growth regime membership probabilities. This substantially increases the
number of parameters to estimate and may require an increase in the sample size, something
that can be problematic given the limited number of countries for which data may be available.
In this paper, we propose to use a three-step approach in which we estimate first the latent
class of our baseline growth regression model; then, in the second step, we estimate the posterior
assignment probabilities using the estimated parameters from the first step; finally, we assess
the determinants of the probability of a country being assigned to the latent growth regime in
which remittances have a positive effect on economic growth using a bias-adjusted correction.
3.2.1 Step 1: The determination of the latent classes
In order to define the model in a simple way let us consider our dependent variable growth,
the key variable of interest remit, and X the set of the additional controls defined above. The
6See Vermunt (2010) for a detailed discussion of these different issues.
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mixture-of-regressions model in its general specification is defined as follow:
f(growth|remit, x; Θ) =
K∑
k=1
pikfk(growth|remit, x;βk, σk) (2)
The parameter K is the number of groups or growth regimes which is unknown, and its optimal
value will be chosen using some goodness of fit criteria such as the BIC and CAIC statistics.
The parameter pik is the proportion of the countries that belongs to the specific growth regime
k; fk(growth|remit, x;βk, σk) is the conditional density of the growth rate in the latent regime k.
The parameters in the latent growth regime k are βk and σk. Both βk and σk are unknown and
will be estimated. We suppose that fk(.) is a Gaussian distribution.
For simple illustration if our data is generated by a model with a single growth regime, which
implies that K=1 then equation 2 is identical to the parametric specification expressed in the
above equation 1 which can be re-written as follow:
growthi,t = β0 + β1remiti,t + β2xi,t + εi,t, ε1 ∼ N(0, σ2) (3)
In this case the impact of remittances on growth is given by β1 and this value is identical for all
countries. In contrast, if we suppose that the data is better generated by two different growth
regimes, assuming that K = 2 then equation 2 can be simplified as follows:
Group 1: growthi,t = β01 + β11remiti,t + β21xi,t + ε1, ε1 ∼ N(0, σ21),
Group 2: growthi,t = β02 + β12remiti,t + β22xi,t + ε2, ε2 ∼ N(0, σ22)
(4)
In this second scenario, the error terms ε1 and ε2 are assumed to be independent. The coef-
ficients on remittances may be different across the two regimes simply because the environment
in which growth occurs differs across regimes. This implies that countries are heterogeneous
and behave differently in their growth process. Hence, ignoring the existence of multiple growth
regimes may lead to wrong conclusions on the effect of remittances on the growth rate. We may
also have more than two growth regimes. The choice of the number of regimes K is crucial and
to select its optimal value one can refer to the previous literature as guidance or simply use
some statistical criteria. In this paper, we combine both the previous results in the literature
and some criteria such as the BIC and the CAIC for the selection of the optimal value for K.
In fact, we refer to the previous studies to fix the maximum number of growth regimes, which
we define as the highest value found in the literature; and then, we use the statistical criteria
to select the number of regimes that may take a value between one and the maximum number
found in the literature.
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3.2.2 Step 2: Countries assignment into latent classes
Once the number of regimes, K, is selected, and the parameters of the model estimated, we
can compute the posterior probability of each country being assigned in a given latent growth
regime k, using the Bayes rule such that:
pˆiik =
pˆikfk(growth|remit, x ; βˆk, σˆk)∑K
k=1 pˆikfk(growth|remit, x ; βˆk, σˆk)
(5)
These estimated probabilities will be used to sort countries into the different growth regimes
found in our sample. The rule is that a given country i belongs to the growth regime k if the
estimated probability pˆiik is higher than the probability pˆiij where i 6= j.
3.2.3 Step 3: Determinants of the latent class membership assignment
The third and last step of this methodology aims at identifying the determinants of variables
that explain the assignment of countries in the growth regime in which remittances have a
significant positive effect on growth using multinomial logistic regression. Let us define kP the
growth regime where remittances have a positive effect on the growth rate. For each country we
assign a value of 0 or 1 using the following rule:
k(i)p =
{
1 if the country i has a higher probability to be in regime p than in regime j where p 6= j,
0 otherwise
(6)
We can then estimate:
pi = Prob(k
(i)
p = 1, ωi) (7)
More explicitly we can express this probability as:
pi =
1
1 + exp(−ωi) (8)
where,
ωi = δ0 + δ1Zi + i (9)
Where Z is a vector of control variables. This third step may provide inconsistent and biased
results in certain circumstances due to the classification errors that may occur in the second
step. Recently, Vermunt (2010) developed the maximum likelihood adjusted-three-step method,
which aims to correct the amount of the classification error from the second step during the
11
procedure in the third step. 7 This adjustment procedure has recently been implemented in
LatentGold 5.0, which makes it suitable for use in our estimations.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Parametric method results
Table 3 presents the results of the parametric approach, in which we consider all countries
to follow the same growth regime or process. Hereafter, we consider 2 different samples of
developing countries. The smaller sample, which includes 92 developing countries, is restricted
to countries that have data available for at least 4 different time periods, half of the total number
of periods in our data. The table reports the pooled, FE and RE effects’ estimations with and
without instrumenting remittances using the first lag. Time dummies are also included in all of
the different estimations. Across the 8 different specifications, the coefficient on remittances is
never significant, even though the sign varies across the columns.
Regarding the other explanatory variables included in the model, we can see that the con-
vergence hypothesis indicated by the negative sign on the coefficient of the initial level of the
GDP per capita is strongly supported in our sample, while the negative effect of the growth of
the population becomes insignificant once we use the FE or RE technique. The investment in
physical capital, which has been considered as one of the most robust determinants of growth
(see Sala-I-Martin et al. (2004)), is positive and significant across the different specifications.
The degree of openness and the inflation affect growth differently but neither of these effects is
robust. Similar to the results on remittances, across the different specifications, the effect of the
level of financial development on the growth rate remains insignificant.
In summary, the results in table 3 show that under the hypothesis of the existence of a
single, unique growth regime for all countries, remittances have neither a negative nor a positive
significant impact on growth. Indeed, across the different columns, remittances have a neutral
effect on the growth rate of countries. Such a result confirms the results of the previous studies
that have found a neutral effect of remittances on the growth rate using different samples and
different techniques under the hypothesis of a single growth model (e.g, Rao and Hassan (2011),
Barajas et al. (2009), Ahamada and Coulibaly (2013) among others). However, if our data
are better generated by a model with more than one growth regime, the results presented in
this section may be biased, and the conclusion on the impact of remittances on the growth
7Bolck et al. (2004) have proposed the use of weighted step-three method for the correction of the classification
error in the third step. Bakk et al. (2013) have presented an extension version of these two methods of adjustment
in a situation where the estimated probabilities are used as independent variable also known as distal variable .
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rate found would be inappropriate. To deal with this issue, we proceed by trying to determine
whether or not the observations in our data are generated by a single growth regime and testing
whether the impact of remittances on the growth rate varies across the detected regimes using
the mixture-of-regressions method.
4.2 Three-step Finite-Mixture-of-Regressions Results
i) First step
We estimate a finite-mixture-of-regressions model in which we assume that our data may be
generated between one and four growth regimes, estimating four different mixture-of-regressions
models. Indeed, according to the previous literature, the optimal number of growth regimes
found using the mixture-of-regressions methodology varies between two and three (Paap et al.
(2005), Alfo et al. (2008), Owen et al. (2009)) 8. Hence, we limit the number of growth regimes
to four based on these previous findings but also because of the limited number of observations,
which may be questionable when we increase the number of regimes, significantly increasing the
number of parameters to estimate.
Table 4 shows the goodness of fit derived from the log-likelihood values of the four different
models estimated. It reports the Bayesian and the consistent Akaike information criterion, which
allow us to select our best model, the one that minimizes these two statistical values. We find
that the econometric model with two regimes records the lowest BIC and CAIC, which indicates
that our data are best generated with a model of two growth regimes. We can also point-out
that the model with one growth regime is the one that records the highest BIC (BIC=2558
for K=1 versus 2524 for K=2, 2530 for K=3 and 2535 for K=4), indicating that there is some
heterogeneity in the data that should not be ignored.
Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients of our selected model with K=2. The first regime
includes 47% of the countries and the remaining 53% are in the second growth regime. When
we focus on our parameter of interest, the coefficient on remittances, we find that in the first
regime remittances do not have a significant impact on the growth rate while in the second group
the coefficient on remittances is positive and significant at the conventional 1% level. The last
two columns of the table show respectively the Wald statistics test and the p-value, which help
to test whether the coefficients on remittances across the two regimes are statistically equal.
The values reported suggest that the impacts of remittances on the growth rate are statistically
different across the two regimes at the 5% level.
8See also Owen and Temesvary (2014), Flachaire et al. (2014) and Konte (2013) among other.
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Turning to the rest of the coefficients that we have in the model, we find that in the second
regime, the financial development and the investment in physical capital have positive and
statistically significant effects on the growth rate, while an increase in the degree of openness
decreases the growth rate. In contrast, in the first regime, all the coefficients are significant
except the one on financial development. The convergence hypothesis is confirmed in this regime,
and more investment in physical capital and more trade openness tend to increase the growth
rate substantially, while high levels of inflation and of population growth tend to hurt the growth
rate of the countries in this regime. The null hypothesis under which the coefficients across the
two regimes are equal is rejected for all the coefficients except for the coefficients on the variable
inflation, for which the rejection is possible only above the 15% level. When we compare the
coefficients that are significant in the two regimes, we can note that policies that are intended to
increase the level of investment in physical capital increase the growth rate in the two regimes,
but such policies have greater potential to increase the growth rate in the first than in the second
regime. Indeed, one can observe that the coefficient on the investment in physical capital is three
times higher for the first regime than for the second one. The degree of openness boosts the
growth rate of countries in the first regime but it hurts the growth rate for countries that are
located in the remittances growth-enhancing regime.
For robustness purposes, we first re-estimate our mixture model using the full sample of
developing countries, which includes all the countries for which data on remittances are available
for at least one period, and second we include education and institutions in our core explanatory
variables. Table 6 and table 7 refer to our first robustness analysis in which we re-estimate our
baseline mixture-of-regressions model using the full sample of developing countries. Again, the
model with two different components is superior to the other models. Furthermore, the effect of
remittances on growth is insignificant for the first regime and significantly positive in the second
regime, which applies to more than 50% of the countries included in the sample. The estimated
coefficients are very similar to the results reported in table 5 with our preferred sample. The
exceptions are the estimated coefficients on financial development and inflation for which we
lose now some significance.
Table 8 shows the goodness of fit for the model in which we include the investment in human
capital, which is measured by the average years of schooling in the population aged over 25
from the compilation of Barro and Lee (2013). We also include a proxy for political institutions
using the index of democracy from the latest Polity IV table. This index is ranked from 0 to 10,
where 0 is allocated to full autocracies like Syria and 10 to full democracies like Costa Rica. It is
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worth noting that the amount of data decreases significantly when we include these 2 additional
variables. Now the number of countries falls from 92 to 70 and the total number of observations
is reduced by more than 100. This significant number of missing data is the reason why we do
not include these 2 variables in our baseline model, but given the importance that education
and institutions have received in the literature, it is worth investigating whether our results may
be affected once we include these 2 variables. The estimations of the selected model with 2
components reported in table 9 support our previous results that remittances have a significant
effect on growth in the second regime while their effect is neutral in the first one. The estimates
of the other variables are quiet similar to the one reported in the previous table 5, except for the
coefficients on financial development and on the degree of openness, which now turn insignificant
in the second regime for the former, and in the first group for the latter. Education has a positive
and significant impact only for the growth rate of the first regime, while the level of democracy
remains insignificant in the first regime and weakly significant in the second regime. Indeed, the
effect of political institutions on the growth rate has received important attention in recent years
and it has been shown that political institutions do not have a direct impact on growth but may
affect it indirectly; e.g Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Flachaire et al. (2014) among others.
ii) Second step
The second step of the mixture-of-regression method consists of classifying countries into the two
different growth regimes using the estimated posterior probabilities. In fact, we consider that
a country will be classified in the growth regime for which its estimated posterior probability
is higher given that the sum of the probability of being in the first regime and the probability
of being in the second regime is equal to 1. Table 10 shows the classification of the countries
into the two regimes using our preferred model reported in table 5 which includes 92 developing
countries. This table shows that roughly 47% of the countries are in the first group and the
remaining 53% are in the second one. It is worth noting that the classification for Ecuador and
Venezuela in the second regime is less clear since their estimated probabilities are slightly higher
than 0.5. There is substantial heterogeneity of countries within growth regimes, in terms of the
level of development and remittances, as well as in terms of geographical location, indicating
that our classification does not coincide with the ones obtained by ad hoc ex ante classifications.
SSA countries represent 21% of the countries in the first group, while they are more likely
to be in the remittances growth-enhancing group, in which they account for almost half of the
components. Furthermore, the classification reported in table 11, which corresponds to the
classification of the model using the full sample, presents similar results. If we look at the
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countries that appear in both table 10 and table 11, we can observe a certain level of stability.
Indeed, only three countries are classified into different regimes across these two tables. These
countries are El Salvador, which has moved from the first regime to the second in the latter
classification table, and the Central African Republic and Venezuela, which have switched from
the second to the first growth regime.
iii) Third step
We now move on the third and last step of the estimation of our mixture-of-regression in
which we assess the determinants of countries’ growth regime membership. Recall that the
model that we estimate here has already been described in section 3.2.3. It is a logit model and
the dependent variable takes a value of one if the country has a higher probability of being in the
remittances growth-enhancing regime and zero otherwise. We control for different indicators of
financial development, a dummy for SSA, a dummy for Latin American and Caribbean countries
and a dummy for being landlocked.
The results in table 12 show the estimations of the probability of being in the remittances
growth-enhancing group using the classification based on the results obtained with our preferred
sample restricted to the developing countries for which data on remittances are available for at
least four time periods. The results show that an increase in the level of financial development
decreases the probability of being in the growth regime for which remittances promote the
growth rate of countries. However, this effect is not statistically significant when we use the
domestic credit provided by the financial sector relative to the GDP as the indicator of financial
development, while the coefficients on liquid liability and broad money both relative to the GDP
are statistically significant.
In column [5], we investigate the extent to which the geographical location may determine the
likelihood that a given country follows the growth regime for which an increase in remittances
boosts the growth rate. We simultaneously control for a Sub-Saharan African dummy, a Latin
and Caribbean dummy and a dummy landlock that indicates whether a country is landlocked
or not. We find that being a Sub-Saharan African country increases the probability of being in
the remittances growth-enhancing regime but neither being a Latin American and Caribbean
country nor being landlocked affect this probability.
In the next table 13 we re-estimate the determinants of the probability of being in the second
growth regime in which remittances affect growth positively using the full sample of developing
countries, which includes all the countries for which data on remittances are available for at
least one time period. In this table, we control for the variables that were significant in the
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previous table 12. We find that the coefficients on the indicators of financial development have
the same sign as in the previous table 12 but they are not significant. However, the coefficient
on the dummy Sub-Saharan Africa is positive and significant with a sign indicating that being
a SSA country increases the probability of being in the remittances growth-enhancing regime.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper seeks to understand why it has been so difficult to find a positive impact of re-
mittances on growth despite the growing amount of remittances in many developing countries
and the different studies that have emphasized the positive effect of remittances on poverty and
inequality. We take into account endogenously the possible unobserved heterogeneity that may
exist in data using a flexible approach, and test whether the impact of remittances on the growth
rate depends on the growth regime to which an economy belongs. We relax the hypothesis that
all countries follow a single, unique growth regime in favor of multiple growth regimes such that
remittances may affect growth differently across the different growth regimes detected . Our
approach consists of applying a bias-adjusted three-step finite-mixture-of-regressions method, a
semi-parametric method suitable for taking into account endogenously the possible heterogene-
ity that may exist in the data. In the first step, we define the latent class model and study the
remittances’ growth effect across the different regimes; in the second step, we predict the growth
regime membership posterior probabilities for all the countries; and in the third step, we use
these estimated probabilities to assess the relationship between growth regime membership and
external variables also known as concomitant variables.
Our results show that the data are best generated by a model of two growth regimes. In
one regime, remittances do not have a significant impact on growth while in the second regime,
remittances have a positive and significant impact on growth. The classification of the countries
in the second step shows substantial heterogeneity of the countries within growth regimes, in
terms of the level of development and the level of remittances, as well as in terms of geographical
location, indicating that our classification does not coincide with the ones obtained by ad hoc
ex ante classifications. SSA countries represent 21% of the countries in the first group, while
they are more likely to be in the remittances growth-enhancing group, in which they account
for almost half of the components. The analysis of the determinants of the probability of being
in the second regime shows, with some reservation about the robustness of the results, that an
increase in the level of financial development decreases the probability of a country being in the
remittances growth-enhancing regime, while being a Sub-Saharan African country increases this
17
probability.
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Table 4: Goodness of fit
Number of regimes BIC CAIC
K=1 2558.37 2574.37
K=2 2524.42 2557.42
K=3 2530.48 2580.48
K=4 2535 2602
The table presents the goodness of fit of the mixture of regression using our preferred sample
which is restricted to countries for which data on remittances are available for at least 4 out of
the 8 time periods. Selected model in bold.
Table 5: Mixture of regression model estimations
growth Class1 Class2 Wald(=) p-value
pi1=0.47 pi2=0.53
Constant 15.7128*** 3.1418 6.0098 0.014
(4.6014) (1.928)
remit -4.4505 3.7368*** 4.4422 0.035
(3.6469) (1.2785)
ln(gdp) -1.4347*** -0.0783 10.2808 0.0013
(0.3876) (0.1523)
ln(pop+0.05) -5.883*** 0.1233 0.21 <∞
(1.2528) (0.364)
ln(invest) 2.1665*** 0.7229*** 5.7537 0.016
(0.5374) (0.2529)
ln(open) 1.6858*** -1.3009*** 0.217 <∞
(0.6209) (0.2766)
ln(inflation) -0.511** -0.0587 2.0336 0.15
(0.2569) (0.1439)
ln(findev) -0.7735 0.6868** 7.9524 0.0048
(0.4166) (0.324)
time dummies .... .....
R-squared 0.2685 0.3808
Nb country 43 49
Nb obs 235 282
This table reports the estimation results of the selected model with 2 components.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The indicator of financial
development reported here, (findev), is the liquid liabilities relative to the GDP.
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Table 6: Goodness of fit-large sample
Number of regimes BIC CAIC
K=1 2906.51 2922.51
K=2 2870.92 2903.92
K=3 2884.82 2934.82
K=4 2918.99 2985.99
The table presents the goodness of fit of the mixture of regression using the full sample which
includes all the countries for which we have data for at least one period. Selected model in
bold.
Table 7: Mixture of regression model estimations-large sample
growth Class1 Class2 Wald(=) p-value
pi1 = 0.57 pi2 = 0.43
Intercept 17.4467*** 2.7083 12.6578 0.00037
(3.7304) (1.8094)
remit -3.2866 3.2792*** 3.3991 0.065
(3.2666) (1.233)
ln(gdp) -1.3972*** 0.0585 18.5975 0.00001
(0.3109) (0.1487)
ln(pop+0.05) -7.3234*** 0.1178 38.5551 <∞
(1.1429) (0.3618)
ln(invest) 1.7439*** 0.8615*** 2.4246 0.12
(0.4648) (0.2796)
ln(openk) 1.8758*** -1.1455*** 27.3679 <∞
(0.554) (0.2443)
ln(inflation) -0.2016 -0.0958 0.2152 0.64
(0.1882) (0.1242)
ln(findev) -0.6075* 0.3279 4.6317 0.031
(0.3502) (0.2505)
time dummies .... .....
R-squared 0.2595 0.3935
Nb country 69 52
Nb obs 287 292
This table reports the estimation results of the selected model with 2 components.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The indicator of financial
development reported here, (findev), is the liquid liabilities relative to the GDP.
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Table 8: Goodness of Fit
BIC CAIC
K=1 1936.98 1954.98
K=2 1928.18 1965.18
K=3 1932.51 1988.51
K=4 1954.17 2029.17
The table presents the goodness of fit of the mixture of regression using our preferred sample
and include education and institutions in the model. Note that results with K=3 and K=4 are
not very stable due to the decrease of the number of observations. Selected model in bold.
Table 9: Mixture of regression model estimations
growth Class1 Class2
pi1=0.56 pi2=0.44
Intercept 13.5033*** 5.1124**
(3.8899) (2.1496)
remit -6.2575 2.7329**
(4.4404) (1.1585)
ln(gdp) -1.8818*** -0.1573
(0.4058) (0.2002)
ln(pop+0.05) -4.4889*** 0.3258
(1.4865) (0.3233)
ln(invest) 1.7189*** 1.1011***
(0.5104) (0.3091)
ln(open) 0.7249 -1.3242***
(0.4899) (0.3577)
ln(inflation) -0.1501 -0.1589
(0.2258) (0.1545)
ln(findev) 0.5871 0.0507
(0.4467) (0.2519)
ln(educ) 1.7647*** -0.341
(0.4659) (0.2648)
dem 0.0202 0.0798*
(0.0661) (0.0408)
R-squared 0.3238 0.4681
Nb country 39 31
Nb Obs 216 187
This table reports the estimation results of the selected model with 2 components.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The indicator of financial
development reported here, (findev), is the liquid liabilities relative to the GDP.
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Table 10: Classification
Group 1 Group 2
Country Prob Country Prob
Albania 0.974 Algeria 0.9352
Armenia 1 Bangladesh 0.8359
Azerbaijan 1 Benin 0.8353
Belize 0.9987 Bolivia 0.9615
Botswana 1 Brazil 0.9586
Cambodia 1 Burkina Faso 0.9987
Cameroon 0.9991 Central African Republic 0.6027
Cape Verde 0.9873 Colombia 0.9804
Dominica 0.9993 Congo, Republic of 0.9966
Dominican Republic 0.9994 Costa Rica 0.8558
Egypt 1 Cote d‘Ivoire 0.8728
El Salvador 0.7057 Djibouti 0.7814
Gambia, The 0.9824 Ecuador 0.5203
Grenada 1 Ethiopia 0.6344
Guinea-Bissau 0.9961 Fiji 0.9654
Guyana 0.9984 Gabon 0.9169
Indonesia 0.9998 Ghana 0.852
Jamaica 0.9912 Guatemala 0.8259
Jordan 1 Guinea 0.9469
Kazakhstan 1 Honduras 0.5792
Kyrgyzstan 0.9349 India 0.9401
Laos 1 Iran 0.8516
Malaysia 1 Kenya 0.9802
Mauritius 0.8909 Lesotho 0.9826
Moldova 0.9173 Madagascar 0.9993
Mozambique 0.9987 Malawi 0.6168
Panama 1 Maldives 0.7975
Papua New Guinea 0.9849 Mali 0.8993
Paraguay 0.9864 Mauritania 0.801
Peru 0.9274 Mexico 0.9937
Romania 0.9624 Morocco 0.9419
Seychelles 0.9993 Namibia 0.7
Sierra Leone 0.6926 Nepal 0.8158
Sri Lanka 0.9994 Nicaragua 0.8975
St, Lucia 0.9994 Niger 1
St,Vincent Grenadines 0.9984 Nigeria 0.8896
Suriname 1 Pakistan 0.8398
Swaziland 1 Philippines 0.9422
Syria 0.8748 Rwanda 1
Tanzania 0.6594 Samoa 0.9704
Thailand 1 Senegal 0.9949
Tonga 0.8723 South Africa 0.9791
Vanuatu 0.9998 Sudan 1
Togo 0.9999
Tunisia 0.8887
Turkey 0.9999
Venezuela 0.5178
Yemen 0.8055
Zimbabwe 0.8952
Classification of countries from the model in table 4 and 5.
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Table 11: Classification-Full sample
Group 1 Group 2
country Prob 1 Country Prob 2
Afghanistan 0.925 Algeria 0.8693
Albania 0.9701 Argentina 0.6737
Angola 1 Bangladesh 0.8231
Armenia 1 Benin 0.7446
Azerbaijan 1 Bolivia 0.9713
Belarus 1 Brazil 0.984
Belize 0.9964 Burkina Faso 0.994
Bhutan 0.8289 Colombia 0.9854
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.5671 Congo, Dem, Rep, 0.5493
Botswana 1 Congo, Republic of 0.9688
Bulgaria 0.8443 Costa Rica 0.9656
Burundi 0.785 Cote d‘Ivoire 0.6398
Cambodia 1 Djibouti 0.5186
Cameroon 1 Ecuador 0.7806
Cape Verde 0.9955 El Salvador* 0.5628
Central African Republic* 0.8895 Ethiopia 0.5694
Chad 1 Fiji 0.966
Comoros 0.9965 Ghana 0.8983
Dominica 0.9995 Guatemala 0.8902
Dominican Republic 0.9944 Guinea 0.8673
Egypt 1 Honduras 0.7431
Gabon 0.9619 India 0.9553
Gambia, The 0.9929 Iran 0.856
Georgia 1 Kenya 0.9847
Grenada 1 Lebanon 0.7181
Guinea-Bissau 0.9989 Lesotho 0.9959
Guyana 0.9984 Libya 0.7971
Haiti 0.7528 Macedonia 0.7797
Indonesia 0.9996 Madagascar 0.9968
Iraq 0.7376 Malawi 0.5005
Jamaica 0.9969 Mali 0.782
Jordan 1 Mauritania 0.723
Kazakhstan 1 Mexico 0.9881
Kyrgyzstan 0.8933 Morocco 0.9213
Laos 0.9998 Namibia 0.6795
Liberia 0.9991 Nepal 0.7854
Malaysia 1 Nicaragua 0.853
Maldives 0.888 Niger 0.997
Mauritius 0.8284 Nigeria 0.6678
Moldova 0.9352 Pakistan 0.8326
Mongolia 0.7385 Philippines 0.9604
Montenegro 0.712 Rwanda 1
Mozambique 0.999 Samoa 0.9785
Panama 1 Senegal 0.9845
Papua New Guinea 0.9961 South Africa 0.9848
Paraguay 0.965 Sudan 1
Peru 0.9331 Togo 0.9987
Romania 0.9549 Tunisia 0.8786
Sao Tome and Principe 0.7422 Turkey 0.9997
Serbia 0.5117 Uganda 0.8111
Seychelles 0.9978 Yemen 0.7823
Sierra Leone 0.6827 Zimbabwe 0.7701
Solomon Islands 0.999
Sri Lanka 0.9993
St, Lucia 0.9992
St,Vincent Grenadines 0.9986
Suriname 1
Swaziland 1
Syria 0.83
Tajikistan 0.9999
Tanzania 0.7104
Thailand 1
Timor-Leste 0.9996
Tonga 0.886
Ukraine 0.9999
Vanuatu 0.9999
Venezuela* 0.6208
Vietnam 0.9986
Zambia 0.899
Classification of countries from the model in tables 6 and 7.
31
Table 12: Determinants of class membership
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Intercept 1.7239 2.9646 5.1256*** -0.5652 3.6206*
(1.6748) (1.8858) (1.7936) (0.4196) (2.0428)
ln(credit/gdp) -0.4981
(0.4692)
ln(liquid liab/gdp) -0.8635*
(0.5222)
ln(broadmoney/gdp) -1.4595*** -1.1209**
(0.4917) (0.5314)
SSA 1.2965** 0.8166
(0.6287) (0.6055)
latincar 0.1587
(0.6625)
landlock 0.0448
(0.6809)
Nb obs 91 92 92 92 92
This table reports results in step 3 using the classification in table 10. *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 13: Determinants of class membership-Full sample
[1] [2] [3]
Intercept 0.5435 -0.0947 -0.684**
(1.2778) (1.272) (0.3004)
ln(liquid liab) -0.2742
(0.3705)
ln(broadmoney/gdp) -0.0879
(0.3632)
SSA 0.7864*
(0.4702)
Nb obs 120 120 121
This table reports results in step 3 using the classification in table 11. *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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